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Abstract. We consider the task of computing an approximation of a
trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic
form, n ≥ 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class
FIXPa. In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task
of computing an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in strategic form
games with three (or more) players.
1 Introduction
Arguably [17], the most important refinement of Nash equilibrium for finite
games in strategic form (a.k.a. games in normal form, i.e., games given by their
tables of payoffs) is Reinhard Selten’s [15] notion of trembling hand perfection.
The set of trembling hand perfect equilibria of a game is a non-empty subset of
the Nash equilibria of that game. Also, many “unreasonable” Nash equilibria of
many games, e.g., those relying on “empty threats” in equivalent extensive forms
of those games, are not trembling hand perfect, thus motivating and justifying
the notion. The importance of the notion is illustrated by the fact that Selten
received the Nobel prize in economics together with Nash (and Harsanyi), “for
their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games”.
In this paper, we study the computational complexity of finding trembling hand
perfect equilibria of games given in strategic form.
The computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium of a game in
strategic form is well-studied. When studying this computational task, we as-
sume that the game given as input is represented as a table of integer (or rational)
payoffs, with each payoff given in binary notation. The output is a strategy pro-
file, i.e., a family of probability distributions over the strategies of each player,
with each probability being a rational number with numerator and denominator
given in binary notation. The computational task is therefore discrete and we
are interested in the Turing machine complexity of solving it. Papadimitriou [13]
showed that for the case of two players, the problem of computing an exact Nash
equilibrium is in PPAD, a natural complexity class introduced in that paper, as
a consequence of the Lemke-Howson algorithm [10] for solving this task. For the
case of three or more players, there are games where no Nash equilibrium which
uses only rational probabilities exists [12], and hence considering some relaxation
of the notion of “computing” a Nash equilibrium is necessary to stay within the
discrete input/output framework outlined above. In particular, Papadimitriou
showed that the problem of computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, with ǫ > 0 given
as part of the input in binary notation, is also in PPAD, as a consequence of
Scarf’s algorithm [14] for solving this task. Here, an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a
strategy profile where no player can increase its utility by more than ǫ by de-
viating. In breakthrough papers, Daskalakis et al. [5] and Chen and Deng [4]
showed that both tasks are also hard for PPAD, hence settling their complexity:
Both are PPAD-complete. Subsequently, Etessami and Yannakakis [6] pointed
out that for some games, ǫ-Nash equilibria can be so remote from any exact
Nash equilibrium (unless ǫ is so small that its binary notation has encoding size
exponential in the size of the game), that the former tells us little or nothing
about the latter. For such games, the ǫ-Nash relaxation is a bad proxy for Nash
equilibrium, assuming the latter is what we are actually interested in comput-
ing. Motivated by this, they suggested a different relaxation: Compute a strategy
profile with ℓ∞-distance at most δ from an exact Nash equilibrium, with δ > 0
again given as part of the input in binary notation. In other words, compute an
actual Nash equilibrium to a desired number of bits of accuracy. They showed
that this problem is complete for a natural complexity class FIXPa that they
introduced in the same paper. Informally, FIXPa is the class of discrete search
problems that can be reduced to approximating (within desired ℓ∞-distance)
any one of the Brouwer fixed points of a function given by an algebraic circuit
using gates: +,−, ∗, /,max,min. (We will formally define FIXPa later.)
In this paper, we want to similarly understand the case of trembling hand
perfect equilibrium. For the case of two players, the problem of computing an
exact trembling hand perfect equilibrium is PPAD-complete. This follows from
a number of known exact pivoting algorithms for computing refinements of this
notion [18,11,16]. For the case of three or more players, we are not aware of any
natural analogue of the notion of ǫ-Nash equilibrium as an approximate proxy
for a trembling hand perfect equilibrium.4 Thus, we only discuss in this paper
the approximation notion of Etessami and Yannakakis. The main result of the
present paper is the following:
Theorem 1. The following computational task is FIXPa-complete for any n ≥
3: Given an integer payoff table for an n-player game Γ , and a rational δ > 0,
with all numbers given in standard binary notation, compute (the binary repre-
sentation of) a strategy profile x′ with rational probabilities having ℓ∞ distance
at most δ to a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of Γ .
4 The already studied notion of an ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE), which we discuss
later, does not qualify as such an analogue: For some three-player games, every ǫ-
PE uses irrational probabilities, and thus “computing” an (exact) ǫ-PE is just as
problematic as computing an exact NE. Indeed, the notion of a ǫ-PE is used as a
technical step towards the definition of trembling hand perfect equilibrium, rather
than as a natural “numerical relaxation” of this notion.
As an immediate corollary of our main theorem, and the results of Etessami
and Yannakakis, we have that approximating a Nash equilibrium and approxi-
mating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium are polynomial time equivalent tasks.
In particular, there is a polynomial time algorithm that finds an approximation
to a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a given game, using access to any
oracle solving the corresponding approximation problem for the case of Nash
equilibrium. To put this result in perspective, we note that Nash equilibrium
and trembling hand perfect equilibrium are computationally quite different in
other respects: if instead of finding an equilibrium, we want to verify that a given
strategy profile is such an equilibrium, the case of Nash equilibrium is trivial,
while the case of trembling hand perfect equilibrium for games with 3 (or more)
players is NP-hard [8]. This might lead one to believe that approximating a trem-
bling hand perfect equilibrium for games with 3 or more players is likely to be
harder than approximating a Nash equilibrium, but we show that this is not the
case.
1.1 About the proof
Informally (for formal definitions, see below), FIXP (resp., FIXPa) is defined as
the complexity class of search problems that can be cast as exactly computing
(resp., approximating) a Brouwer fixed point of functions represented by circuits
over basis {+, ∗,−, /,max,min} with rational constants. It was established in
[6] that computing (resp., approximating) an actual Nash Equilibrium (NE)
for a finite n-player game is FIXP-complete (resp., FIXPa-complete), already for
n = 3. Since trembling hand perfect equilibria constitute a refinement of Nash
Equilibria, to show that approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium is
FIXPa-complete, we merely have to show that this task is in FIXPa.
An ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE for short) is defined to be a fully mixed strat-
egy profile, x, where every strategy j of every player i that is played with proba-
bility xi,j > ǫ must be a best response to the other player’s strategies x−i. Then,
a trembling hand perfect equilibrium (PE for short) is defined to be a limit point
of a sequence of ǫ-PEs, for ǫ > 0, ǫ→ 0. Here, by limit point we mean, as usual,
any point to which a subsequence of the sequence converges. Such a point must
exist, by the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem.
In rough outline, our proof that approximating a PE is in FIXPa has the
following structure:
1. We first define (in section 3) for any n-player game Γ , a map, F ǫΓ , param-
eterized by a parameter ǫ > 0, so that F ǫΓ defines a map from D
ǫ
Γ to itself,
where DǫΓ denotes the space of fully mixed strategy strategy profiles x such
that every player plays each strategy with probability at least ǫ. Also, F ǫΓ (x)
is described by a {+,−, ∗,min,max}-circuit with ǫ as one of its inputs. In
particular, the Brouwer fixed point theorem applies to this map. We show
that the circuit defining F ǫΓ can be computed in polynomial time from the
input game instance Γ , and that every Brouwer fixed point of F ǫΓ is an ǫ-PE
of the original game Γ , making crucial use of, and modifying, a new fixed
point characterization of NEs that was defined and used in [6].
2. We then show (in section 4) that if ǫ∗ > 0 is made sufficiently small as a
function of the encoding size |Γ | of the game Γ , and of a parameter δ > 0,
specifically if ǫ∗ ≤ δ2
g(|Γ |)
, where g is some polynomial, then any ǫ∗-PE must
be δ-close (in the l∞-norm) to an actual PE. This part of the proof relies on
real algebraic geometry.
3. We then observe (in section 5) that for any desired δ, we can encode such
a sufficiently small ǫ∗ > 0 as a circuit that is polynomially large in the
encoding size of Γ and δ, simply by repeated squaring. We think of this as
constructing a virtual infinitesimal and believe that this technique will have
many other applications in the context of proving FIXPa membership using
real algebraic geometry. Finally, plugging in the circuit for ǫ∗ for the input
ǫ in the circuit for F ǫΓ , we obtain a Brouwer function F
ǫ∗
Γ (x), defined by a
{+,−, ∗,max,min}-circuit, such that any fixed point of F ǫ
∗
Γ (x) is guaranteed
to be a fully mixed strategy profile, x∗ǫ∗ , that is also within l∞ distance δ of
a PE, x∗, of Γ . The triangle inequality completes the proof.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
2.1 Game-theoretic notions
We use Q+ to denote the set of positive rational numbers. A finite n-player
normal form game, Γ = (N, 〈Si〉i∈N , 〈ui〉i∈N ), consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n}
of n players indexed by their number, a set of n (disjoint) finite sets of pure
strategies, Si, one for each player i ∈ N , and n rational-valued payoff functions
ui : S → Q, from the product strategy space S = Πni=1Si to Q.
The elements of S, i.e., combinations of pure strategies, one for each player,
are called pure strategy profiles. The assumption of rational values is for computa-
tional purposes. Each rational number r is represented as usual by its numerator
and denominator in binary, and we use size(r) to denote the number of bits in
the representation. The size |Γ | of the instance (game) Γ is the total number of
bits needed to represent all the information in the game: the strategies of all the
players and their payoffs for all s ∈ S.
A mixed strategy, xi, for a player i is a probability distribution on its set
Si of pure strategies. Letting mi = |Si|, we view xi as a real-valued vector
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,mi) ∈ [0, 1]
mi, where xi,j denotes the probability with which
player i plays pure strategy j in the mixed strategy xi. Note that we must have
xi ≥ 0 and
∑mi
i=1 xi,mi = 1. That is, a vector xi is a mixed strategy of player
i iff it belongs to the unit simplex ∆mi = {y ∈ R
mi |y ≥ 0;
∑mi
j=1 yj = 1}. We
use the notation πi,j to identify the pure strategy j of player i, as well as its
representation as a mixed strategy that assigns probability 1 to strategy j and
probability 0 to the other strategies of player i.
A mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a combination of mixed strategies
for all the players. That is, vector x is a mixed strategy profile iff it belongs to the
product of the n unit simplexes for the n players, {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0;
∑mi
j=1 xi,j = 1
for i = 1, . . . , k}. We let DΓ denote the set of all mixed profiles for game Γ .
The profile is fully mixed if all the pure strategies of all players have nonzero
probability. We use the notation x−i to denote the subvector of x induced by
the pure strategies of all players except for player i. If yi is a mixed strategy of
player i, we use (yi;x−i) to denote the mixed profile where everyone plays the
same strategy as x except for player i, who plays mixed strategy yi.
The payoff function of each player can be extended from pure strategy profiles
to mixed profiles, and we will use Ui to denote the expected payoff function
for player i. Thus the (expected) payoff Ui(x) of mixed profile x for player i
is
∑
x1,j1 . . . xk,jkui(j1, . . . , jk) where the sum is over all pure strategy profiles
(j1, . . . , jk) ∈ S.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a (mixed) strategy profile x∗ such that all i =
1, . . . , n and every mixed strategy yi for player i, Ui(x
∗) ≥ Ui(yi;x∗−i). It is
sufficient to check switches to pure strategies only, i.e., x∗ is a NE iff Ui(x
∗) ≥
Ui(πi,j ;x
∗
−i) for every pure strategy j ∈ Si, for each player i = 1, . . . , n. Every
finite game has at least one NE [12].
A mixed profile x is called a ǫ-perfect equilibrium (ǫ-PE) if it is (a) fully
mixed, i.e., xi,j > 0 for all i, and (b), for every player i and pure strategy j, if
xi,j > ǫ, then the pure strategy πi,j is a best response for player i to x−i. We
call a mixed profile x∗, a trembling hand perfect equilibrium (PE) of Γ if it is a
limit point of ǫ-PEs of the game Γ . In other words, we call x a PE if there exists
a sequence ǫk > 0, such that limk→∞ ǫk = 0, and such that for all k there is a
corresponding ǫk-PE, x
ǫk of Γ , such that limk→∞ x
ǫk = x∗. Every finite game
has at least one PE, and all PEs are NEs [15].
2.2 Complexity theoretic notions
A {+,−, ∗,max,min}-circuit is a circuit with inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn, as well as ra-
tional constants, and a finite number of (binary) computation gates taken from
{+,−, ∗,min,max}, with a subset of the computation gates labeled {o1, o2, . . . , om}
and called output gates.5
All circuits of this paper are {+,−, ∗,min,max}-circuits, so we shall often just
write “circuit” for “{+,−, ∗,min,max}-circuit”. A circuit computes a continuous
function from Rn → Rm (and Qn → Qm) in the natural way. Abusing notation
slightly, we shall often identify the circuit with the function it computes.
By a (total) multi-valued function, f , with domain A and co-domain B, we
mean a function that maps each a ∈ A to a non-empty subset f(a) ⊆ B. We
use f : A։ B to denote such a function. Intuitively, when considering a multi-
valued function as a computational problem, we are interested in producing just
one of the elements of f(a) on input a, so we refer to f(a) as the set of allowed
outputs. A multi-valued function f : {0, 1}∗ ։ R∗ is said to be in FIXP if there
is a polynomial time computable map, r, that maps each instance I ∈ {0, 1}∗ of
f to r(I) = 〈1k
I
, 1d
I
, P I , CI , aI , bI〉, where
– kI , dI are positive integers and aI , bI ∈ Qd
I
.
5 Note that the gates {+,−, ∗,min,max} are of course redundant: gates {+, ∗,max}
with rational constants are equally expressive.
– P I is a convex polytope in Rk
I
, given as a set of linear inequalities with
rational coefficients.
– CI is a circuit which maps P I to itself.
– φI : {1, . . . , dI} → {1, . . . , kI} is a finite function given by its table.
– f(I) = {(aIi yφI(i) + b
I
i )
dI
i=1 | y ∈ P
I ∧ CI(y) = y}. Note that f(I) 6= ∅, by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
The above is in fact one of many equivalent characterizations of FIXP [6]. Infor-
mally, FIXP are those real vector multi-valued functions, with discrete inputs,
that can be cast as Brouwer fixed point computations. A multi-valued function
f : {0, 1}∗ ։ R∗ is said to be FIXP-complete if:
1. f ∈ FIXP, and
2. for all g ∈ FIXP, there is a polynomial time computable map, mapping
instances I of g to 〈yI , 1k
I
, 1d
I
, φI , aI , bI〉, where yI is an instance of f , kI
and dI are positive integers, φI maps {1, . . . , dI} to {1, . . . , kI}, aI and bI
are dI -tuples with rational entries, so that g(I) ⊇ {(aIi zφI(i) + b
I
i )
dI
i=1 | z ∈
f(yI)}. In other words, for any allowed output z of f on input yI , the vector
(aIi zφI(i) + b
I
i )
dI
i=1 is an allowed output of g on input I.
Etessami and Yannakakis [6] showed that the multi-valued function which maps
games in strategic form to their Nash equilibria is FIXP-complete.6
Since the output of a FIXP function consists of real-valued vectors, and as
there are circuits whose fixed points are all irrational, a FIXP function is not
directly computable by a Turing machine, and the class is therefore not directly
comparable with standard complexity classes of total search problems (such as
PPAD, PLS, or TFNP). This motivates the following definition of the discrete
class FIXPa, also from [6]. A multi-valued function f : {0, 1}∗ ։ {0, 1}∗ (a.k.a.
a totally defined discrete search problem) is said to be in FIXPa if there is a
function f ′ ∈ FIXP, and polynomial time computable maps δ : {0, 1}∗ → Q+
and g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, such that for all instances I,
f(I) ⊇ { g(〈I, y〉) | y ∈ Q∗ ∧ ∃y′ ∈ f ′(I) : ‖y − y′‖∞ ≤ δ(I) }.
Informally, FIXPa are those totally defined discrete search problems that re-
duce to approximating exact Brouwer fixed points. A multi-valued function
f : {0, 1}∗ ։ {0, 1}∗ is said to be FIXPa-complete if:
1. f ∈ FIXPa, and
2. For all g ∈ FIXPa, there are polynomial time computable maps r1, r2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, such that g(I) ⊇ { r2(〈I, z〉) | z ∈ f(r1(I)) }.
Etessami and Yannakakis showed that the multi-valued function that maps pairs
〈Γ, δ〉, where Γ is a strategic form game and δ > 0, to the set of rational δ-
approximations (in ℓ∞-distance) of Nash equilibria of Γ , is FIXPa-complete.
6 To view the Nash equilibrium problem as a total multi-valued function, fNash :
{0, 1}∗ ։ R∗, we can view all strings in {0, 1}∗ as encoding some game, by viewing
“ill-formed” input strings as encoding a fixed trivial game.
3 Computing ǫ-PEs in FIXP
Given a game Γ , let m =
∑
i∈N mi denote the total number of pure strategies
of all players in Γ . For ǫ > 0, let DǫΓ ⊆ DΓ denote the polytope of fully mixed
profiles of Γ such that furthermore every pure strategy is played with probability
at least ǫ > 0 (recall that DΓ is the polytope of all strategy profiles). In this
section, we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There is a function, F ǫΓ (x) : DΓ → D
ǫ
Γ , given by a circuit com-
putable in polynomial time from Γ , with the circuit having both x and ǫ > 0
as its inputs, such that for all fixed 0 < ǫ < 1/m, every Brouwer fixed point of
the function F ǫΓ (x) is an ǫ-PE of Γ . In particular, the problem of computing an
ǫ-perfect equilibrium for a finite n-player normal form game is in FIXP.
The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2. We will directly
use, and somewhat modify, a construction developed and used in [6] (Lemmas
4.6 and 4.7, and definitions before them) which characterize the Nash Equilibria
of a game as fixed points of a {+,−, ∗,max,min}-circuit. In particular, compared
to Nash’s original functions [12], the use of division is avoided. The construction
defined in [6] that we modify amounts to a concrete algebraic realization of
certain geometric characterizations of Nash Equilibria that were described by
Gul, Pierce, and Stachetti in [7].
Concretely, suppose we are given 0 < ǫ < 1/m. For each mixed strategy
profile x, let v(x) be a vector which gives the expected payoff of each pure
strategy of each player with respect to the profile x for the other players. That is,
vector x is a vector of dimension m, whose entries are indexed by pairs (i, j), i =
1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . ,mi, and v(x) is also a vector of dimensionm whose (i, j)-entry
is Ui(πi,j ;x−i). Let h(x) = x + v(x). We can write h(x) as (h1(x), . . . , hn(x))
where hi(x) is the subvector corresponding to the strategies of player i. For each
player i, consider the function fi,x(t) =
∑
j∈Si
max(hij(x)− t, ǫ). Clearly, this is
a continuous, piecewise linear function of t. The function is strictly decreasing as
t ranges from −∞ (where fi,x(t) = +∞) up to maxj hij(x)− ǫ (where fi,x(t) =
mi · ǫ). Since we have mi · ǫ < 1, there is a unique value of t, call it ti, where
fi,x(ti) = 1. The function F
ǫ
Γ is defined as follows:
F ǫΓ (x)ij = max(hij(x)− ti, ǫ)
for every i = 1, . . . , n, and j ∈ Si. From our choice of ti, we have
∑
j∈Si
F ǫΓ (x)ij =
1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, thus for any mixed profile, x, we have F ǫΓ (x) ∈ D
ǫ
Γ . So F
ǫ
Γ
maps DΓ to D
ǫ
Γ , and since it is clearly also continuous, it has fixed points, by
Brouwer’s theorem.
Lemma 1. For 0 < ǫ < 1/m, every fixed point of the function F ǫΓ is an ǫ-PE
of Γ .
Proof. If x is a fixed point of F ǫΓ , then xij = max(xij + v(x)ij − ti, ǫ) for all i, j.
Recall that v(x)ij = Ui(πi,j ;x−i) is the expected payoff for player i of his j’th
pure strategy πi,j , with respect to strategies x−i of the other players.
Note that the equation xij = max(xij + Ui(πi,j ;x−i) − ti, ǫ) implies that
Ui(πi,j ;x−i) = ti for all i, j such that xij > ǫ, and that Ui(πi,j ;x−i) ≤ ti for all
i, j such that xij = ǫ. Consequently, by definition, x constitutes an ǫ-PE. ⊓⊔
The following Lemma shows that we can implement the function F ǫΓ (x) by
a circuit which has x and ǫ as inputs. The proof exploits sorting networks.
Lemma 2. Given Γ , we can construct in polynomial time a {+,−, ∗,max,min}-
circuit that computes the function F ǫΓ (x), where x and ǫ are inputs to the circuit.
Proof. The circuit does the following.
Given a vector x ∈ DΓ , first compute y = h(x) = x + v(x). It is clear from
the definition of v(x) that y can be computed using +, ∗ gates. For each player
i, let yi be the corresponding subvector of y induced by the strategies of player
i. Sort yi in decreasing order, and let zi be the resulting sorted vector, i.e. the
components of zi = (zi1, . . . , zimi) are the same as the components of yi, but they
are sorted: zi1 ≥ zi2 ≥ . . . ≥ zimi . To obtain zi, the circuit uses a polynomial
sized sorting network,Wi, for each i (see e.g. Knuth [9] for background on sorting
networks). For each comparator gate of the sorting network we use a max and
a min gate.
Using this, for each player i, we compute ti as the following expression:
max{(1/l) · ((
l∑
j=1
zij) + (mi − l) · ǫ− 1)|l = 1, · · · ,mi}
We will show below that this expression does indeed give the correct value
of ti. Finally, we output x
′
ij = max(yij − ti, ǫ) for each i = 1, . . . , d; j ∈ Si.
We now have to establish that ti = max{(1/l)·((
∑l
j=1 zij)+(mi−l)·ǫ−1)|l =
1, · · · ,mi}. Consider the function fi,x(t) =
∑
j∈Si
max(zij − t, ǫ) as t decreases
from zi1 − ǫ where the function value is at its minimum of miǫ, down until the
function reaches the value 1. In the first interval from zi1 − ǫ to zi2 − ǫ the
function is fi,x(t) = zi1 − t + (mi − 1) · ǫ; in the second interval from zi2 − ǫ
to zi3 − ǫ it is fi,x(t) = zi1 + zi2 − 2t + (mi − 2) · ǫ, and so forth. In general,
in the l-th interval, fi,x(t) =
∑l
j=1(zij − t) + (mi − l) · ǫ =
∑l
j=1 zij − lt +
(mi − l) · ǫ. If the function reaches the value 1 in the l’th interval, then clearly
ti = ((
∑l
j=1 zij) + (mi − l) · ǫ − 1)/l. In that case, furthermore for k < l, we
have
∑k
j=1(zij − ti) + (mi − k) · ǫ ≤
∑l
j=1(zij − ti) + (mi − l) · ǫ = 1, because in
that case we know (zij − ti) ≥ ǫ for every j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Therefore, in this case
((
∑k
j=1 zij) + (mi − k) · ǫ − 1)/k ≤ ti. On the other hand, if l < mi, then for
k > l we have ti ≥ zik − ǫ, i.e., zik − ti ≤ ǫ, and thus for all k > l, k ≤ mi, we
have
∑k
j=1(zij − ti) + (mi− k) · ǫ ≤
∑l
j=1(zij − ti)+ (mi− l) · ǫ = 1. Thus again
((
∑k
j=1 zij) + (mi − k) · ǫ− 1)/k ≤ ti. Therefore, ti = max{(1/l) · ((
∑l
j=1 zij) +
(mi − l) · ǫ− 1)|l = 1, · · · ,mi}. ⊓⊔
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 together immediately imply Theorem 2.
4 Almost implies near
As outlined in the introduction, in this section, we want to exploit the “uniform”
function F ǫΓ (x) devised in the previous section for ǫ-PEs, and construct a “small
enough” ǫ∗ > 0 such that any fixed point of F ǫ
∗
Γ (x) is δ-close, for a given δ > 0,
to an actual PE.
The following is a special case of the simple but powerful “almost implies
near” paradigm of Anderson [1].
Lemma 3 (Almost implies near). For any fixed strategic form game Γ , and
any δ > 0, there is an ǫ > 0, so that any ǫ-PE of Γ has ℓ∞-distance at most δ
to some PE of Γ .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is a game Γ and a δ > 0 so that for
all ǫ > 0, there is an ǫ-PE xǫ of Γ so that there is no PE in a δ-neighborhood
(with respect to l∞ norm) of xǫ. Consider the sequence (x1/n)n∈N. Since this is
a sequence in a compact space (namely, the space of mixed strategy profiles of
Γ ), it has a limit point, x∗, which is a PE of Γ (since xǫ is a ǫ-PE). But this
contradicts the statement that there is no PE in a δ-neighborhood of any of the
profiles x1/n. ⊓⊔
A priori, we have no bound on ǫ, but we next use the machinery of real
algebraic geometry [2,3] to obtain a specific bound as a “free lunch”, just from
the fact that Lemma 3 is true.
Lemma 4. There is a constant c, so that for all integers n,m, k,B ∈ N and
δ ∈ Q+, the following holds. Let ǫ ≤ min(δ, 1/B)n
cm3
. For any n-player game
Γ , with a combined total of m pure strategies for all players, and with integer
payoffs of absolute value at most B, any ǫ-PE of Γ has ℓ∞-distance at most δ
to some PE of Γ .
Proof. The proof involves constructing formulas in the first order theory of real
numbers, which formalize the “almost implies near” statement of Lemma 3, with
δ being “hardwired” as a constant and ǫ being the only free variable. Then, we
apply quantifier elimination to these formulas. This leads to a quantifier free
statement to which we can apply standard theorems bounding the size of an
instantiation of the free variable ǫ making the formula true. We shall apply and
refer to theorems in the monograph of Basu, Pollack and Roy [2,3]. Note that we
specifically refer to theorems and page numbers of the online edition [3]; these
are in general different from the printed edition [2].
First-order formula for an ǫ-perfect equilibrium: Define Ri(x \ k) as the polyno-
mial expressing Ui(πi,k;x−i), that is, the expected payoff to player i when it uses
pure strategy k, and the other players play according to their mixed strategy in
the profile x. Thus,
Ri(x \ k) :=
∑
a−i
ui(k; a−i)
∏
j 6=i
xj,aj .
Let EPS-PE(x, ǫ) be the quantifier-free first-order formula, with free variables
x ∈ Rm and ǫ ∈ R, defined by the conjunction of the following formulas that
together express that x is an ǫ-perfect equilibrium:
xi,j > 0 for i = 1 . . . , n, and j = 1, . . . ,mi ,
xi,1 + · · ·+ xi,mi = 1 for i = 1 . . . , n ,
(Ri(x \ k) ≥ Ri(x \ l)) ∨ (xi,k ≤ ǫ) for i = 1 . . . , n, and k, l = 1, . . . ,mi .
First-order formula for perfect equilibrium: Let PE(x) denote the following first-
order formula with free variables x ∈ Rm, expressing that x is a perfect equilib-
rium:
∀ǫ > 0 ∃y ∈ Rm : EPS-PE(y, ǫ) ∧ ‖x− y‖2 < ǫ .
First-order formula for “almost implies near” statement: Given a fixed δ > 0 let
PE-boundδ(ǫ) denote the following first-order formula with free variable ǫ ∈ R,
denoting that any ǫ-perfect equilibrium of G is δ-close to a perfect equilibrium
(in ℓ2-distance, and therefore also in ℓ∞-distance):
∀x ∈ Rm ∃y ∈ Rm : (ǫ > 0) ∧
(
¬EPS-PE(x, ǫ) ∨
(
PE(y) ∧ ‖x− y‖2 < δ2
))
.
Suppose δ2 = 2−k and the payoffs have absolute value at most B = 2τ . Then
for this formula we have
– The total degree of all involved polynomials is at most max(2, n− 1).
– The bitsize of coefficients is at most max(k, τ).
– The number of free variables is 1.
– Converting to prenex normal form, the formula has 4 blocks of quantifiers,
of sizes m, m, 1, m, respectively.
We now apply quantifier elimination [3, Algorithm 14.6, page 555] to the
formula PE-boundδ(ǫ), converting it into an equivalent quantifier free formula
PE-bound′δ(ǫ) with a single free variable ǫ. This is simply a Boolean formula
whose atoms are sign conditions on various polynomials in ǫ. The bounds given
by Basu, Pollack and Roy in association to Algorithm 14.6 imply that for this
formula:
– The degree of all involved polynomials (which are univariate polynomials in
ǫ) is max(2, n− 1)O(m
3) = nO(m
3).
– The bitsize of all coefficients is at most max(k, τ)max(2, n − 1)O(m
3) =
max(k, τ)nO(m
3).
By Lemma 3, we know that there exists an ǫ > 0 so that the formula
PE-bound′δ(ǫ) is true. We now apply (as the involved polynomials are univari-
ate, simpler tools would also suffice) Theorem 13.14 of Basu, Pollack and Roy
[3, Page 521] to the set of polynomials that are atoms of PE-bound′δ(ǫ) and
conclude that PE-bound′δ(ǫ
∗) is true for some ǫ∗ ≥ 2−max(k,τ)n
O(m3)
. By the
semantics of the formula PE-boundδ(ǫ), we also have that PE-boundδ(ǫ
′) is true
for all ǫ′ ≤ ǫ∗, and the statement of the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
5 Proof of the main theorem
We now prove Theorem 1. Let Γ be the n-player game given as input. Let m
be the combined total number of pure strategies for all players. Let B ∈ N be
the largest absolute value of any payoff of Γ . By the definition of FIXPa, our
task is the following. Given a parameter δ > 0, we must construct a polytope
P , a circuit C : P → P , and a number δ′, so that δ′-approximations to fixed
points of C can be efficiently transformed into δ-approximations of PEs of Γ . In
fact, we shall let δ′ = δ/2 and ensure that δ′-approximations to fixed points of
C are δ-approximations of PEs of Γ . The polytope P is simply the polytope DΓ
of all strategy profiles of Γ ; clearly we can output the inequalities defining this
polytope in polynomial time. The circuit C is the following: We construct the
circuit for the function F ǫΓ of Section 3. Then, we construct a circuit for the num-
ber ǫ∗ = min(δ/2, B−1)2
⌈cm3 lgn⌉
≤ min(δ/2, B−1)n
cm3
, where c is the constant
of Lemma 4: The circuit simply repeatedly squares the number min(δ/2, B−1)
(which is a rational constant) and thereby consists of exactly ⌈cm3 lgn⌉ multi-
plication gates, i.e., a polynomially bounded number. We then plug in the circuit
for ǫ∗ for the parameter ǫ in the circuit for F ǫΓ , obtaining the circuit C, which is
obviously a circuit for F ǫ
∗
Γ . Now, by Theorem 2, any fixed point of C on P is an
ǫ∗-PE of Γ . Therefore, by Lemma 4, any fixed point of C is a δ/2-approximation
in ℓ∞-distance to a PE of Γ . Finally, by the triangle inequality, any δ
′ = δ/2-
approximation to a fixed point of C on P is a δ/2+ δ/2 = δ approximation of a
PE of Γ . This completes the proof.
6 Conclusion
We have showed that the problem of approximating a trembling hand perfect
equilibrium for a finite strategic form game is in FIXPa. We do not know if exactly
computing a trembling hand perfect equilibrium is in FIXP, and we consider this
an interesting open problem, although it should be noted that if one is interested
exclusively in the Turing Machine complexity of the problem, FIXPa membership
of the approximation version is arguably “the real thing”. We also note that
this makes our proof interesting as a case where membership in FIXPa is not
established as a simple corollary of the exact problem being in the “abstract
class” FIXP, as was the case for all examples in the original paper of Etessami
and Yannakakis.
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